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Ann likes oranges much more than apples; Bob likes apples much more than oranges. Tomorrow they will
receive one fruit that will be an orange or an apple with equal probability. Giving one half to each agent is
fair for each realization of the fruit. However, agreeing that whatever fruit appears will go to the agent who
likes it more gives a higher expected utility to each agent and is fair in the average sense: in expectation,
each agent prefers his allocation to the equal division of the fruit, i.e., he gets a fair share. We turn this
familiar observation into an economic design problem: upon drawing a random object (the fruit), we learn
the realized utility of each agent and can compare it to the mean of his distribution of utilities; no other
statistical information about the distribution is available. We fully characterize the division rules using only
this sparse information in the most e cient possible way, while giving everyone a fair share. Although the
probability distribution of individual utilities is arbitrary and mostly unknown to the manager, these rules
perform in the same range as the best rule when the manager has full access to this distribution.
Key words : fair division, goods or bads, prior-independent mechanisms, competitive ratio
1. Introduction
The trade-o↵ between fairness and e ciency is a popular concern throughout the social sciences
(e.g., Okun 1975), but its formal evaluation is a fairly recent concern (Caragiannis et al. 2009,
Bertsimas et al. 2011, 2012).
In the case of rules to divide fairly a random object, this trade-o↵ depends on the information
available to the rule. We characterize here a family of division rules that are fair in expectation, use
minimal information about the underlying distribution of utilities, and are the most e cient with
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these two properties. E ciency is measured by the sum of utilities calibrated by their mean values.
We also deliver a surprisingly optimistic message to the risk-averse manager, who evaluates the
rules by their worst-case behavior: our rules have almost the same worst-case e ciency as optimal
rules when the manager has full access to the distribution.
Before discussing our model and results formally, we illustrate them in a stylized example.
Example 1. Two agents, a located in town A and b located in B, work as repairmen for the
same company. The manager distributing incoming orders (jobs) looks for a fair and e cient
procedure to allocate tasks between a and b. The agents’ salary is independent of the number of
jobs they perform, and so each agent wants to have as little work as possible. Hence, in this story,
the manager must allocate a bad.1
The jobs may come from one of three towns A, B, or C, and each agent prefers to work in his
own town. When a new order arrives, the manager learns the disutility of both agents for this
particular job. These disutilities are presented in Table 1. A and B are small towns and are each
responsible for 1
4
of all orders, while C is big and half of the orders come from there.
Table 1 Disutilities and
probabilities
town A B C
agent a 1 5 5
agent b 5 3 4
probability 1/4 1/4 1/2
If the only objective of the manager is to minimize the social cost (the sum of expected disutilities)
and fairness is not an issue, then she allocates each job to the lowest disutility agent, following the
familiar Utilitarian rule. See Table 2.
Table 2 Utilitarian rule
town A B C expected costs social cost
agent a 1 0 0 0.25
3
agent b 0 1 1 2.75
So agent b takes all jobs from towns B and C and incurs expected costs of 0 · 5
4
+1 · 3
4
+1 · 4
2
= 11
4
=
2.75. This exceeds his disutility of 2 in the benchmark Equal Split allocation where the manager
flips a fair coin to allocate each job. In this sense the Utilitarian rule is unfair to agent b.
The Fair Share requirement says that each agent must (weakly) prefer his allocation to the
Equal Split. In our example it caps the expected disutility of each agent at 2, to ensure that he is
1 If instead each new job is desirable for both agents (as in piecemeal work), the manager must allocate a random
good, which we briefly discuss afterward.
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treated fairly in expectation, i.e., ex ante. Ex ante fairness is especially compelling if the allocation
decision is repetitive as in our example. It is rather permissive and leaves room for e ciency gains
by exploiting di↵erences in individual preferences. If the manager knows the prior distribution over
the incoming jobs, i.e., the whole of Table 1 including the probabilities, she finds the allocation
minimizing the social cost under the Fair Share requirement by solving a linear program. This
Optimal fair prior-dependent rule reallocates 3
8
of the orders from town C to a to guarantee his
fair share to b (Table 3).
Table 3 Optimal fair prior-dependent rule
town A B C expected costs social cost
agent a 1 0 3/8 19/16 = 1.1875
3.1875
agent b 0 1 5/8 2
How well can the manager do if, upon arrival of a new order, she only learns the vector of
disutilities and has no clue about the underlying probabilities of other possible orders? If she has
no additional information at all, then the Equal Split is the only available fair rule. Indeed, without
a common scale or a reference point for the disutility of each agent, how can she react to the
observation that, for a particular job, the disutility of agent a is 5 and that of b is 3? Giving to
agent b more than half of this job (in probability) may violate Fair Share for b if 3 is greater than
b’s average disutility for a job; similarly she cannot give more than half to agent a: what if 5 is
greater than a’s expected disutility? In other words, there are no non-trivial prior-independent fair
rules.
We assume that the manager can scale disutilities: upon realization of an object she knows
each agent’s disutility normalized by its mean value. In our example she may observe the realized
absolute cost of each job to each agent, and know as well their expected costs, a simple first moment
estimated from previous draws. Or the agents themselves may report, directly and truthfully, the
ratios of absolute to average costs.
We focus on division rules taking as inputs the vector of normalized disutilities, and call these
rules almost prior-independent (API). To use API rules, the manager does not need any statistical
information about the underlying distribution except the average costs. These rules are practical if
the manager’s decisions are based on a small sample of observations (say two dozen), enough to get
a reasonable estimate of the mean but not enough to estimate the whole distribution. Moreover, in
our example, the repairman may have a good understanding of the average time it takes to complete
a certain task but may find reporting the distribution or even its second moment problematic.
Surprisingly, the minimal amount of information required by API rules is enough to implement
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Fair Share, while incurring a social cost close to that of the Optimal fair prior-dependent rule; this
makes the API family appealing even if the manager has some extra statistical information.
A simple example of a fair API rule is the Proportional rule: it divides each job between the
agents in proportion to their inverse normalized costs. In our example both expected costs are
equal to 4 and so we can use absolute costs instead of normalized ones. The Proportional rule picks
the allocation in Table 4.
Table 4 Proportional rule
town A B C expected costs social cost
agent a 5/6 3/8 4/9 515/288⇡ 1.788 ⇡ 3.576
agent b 1/6 5/8 5/9 515/288⇡ 1.788
Our main results characterize the most e cient fair API division rules. For bads, it is a single
rule that we call the Bottom-Heavy rule. It has smaller a social cost than any other fair API rule,
especially the Proportional one. In our example, it selects the allocation in Table 5. The social cost
Table 5 Bottom-Heavy rule
town A B C expected costs social cost
agent a 1 1/6 3/8 67/48⇡ 1.396 ⇡ 3.271
agent b 0 5/6 5/8 15/8 = 1.875
of the Bottom-Heavy rule (67/48 + 15/8⇡ 3.271) is only 102.6% of the cost for the Optimal fair
prior-dependent rule, which is equal to 19
16
+2= 3.1875. The allocation of the Proportional rule is
only within 112% of this optimum.
As we show, the social cost of the Bottom-Heavy rule is always close to the optimal social cost
in the two-agent case. In other words, the improvement in e ciency from collecting the detailed
statistical data is negligible, and it is enough to know expectations to approximate the optimal
social cost. If the number of agents is large, the Optimal fair prior-dependent rule may significantly
outperform the Bottom-Heavy rule for some distributions, but the worst-case guarantees of both
rules remain close to each other. So the Bottom-Heavy rule remains a good choice for a risk-averse
manager even if the population of agents is large.
All the rules and results that we just described have their analogs for goods. Yet problems with
goods and problems with bads are not equivalent. That is to say, the results for goods and bads are
similar but not mirror images of one another. In particular, the social cost of the Bottom-Heavy
rule for bads is lower than that of any other API fair rule not only in expectation but also ex post,
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i.e., given the realization of the vector of disutilities. But for goods we find a one-parameter family
of Top-Heavy rules that are not dominated by any other rule ex post.2
The lack of equivalence between goods and bads stems from the fact that agents dividing bads
prefer smaller shares regardless of disutilities while agents dividing goods want bigger shares. To
illustrate this point, consider a natural attempt to make goods from bads, namely, by adding a
large enough constant p to all disutilities. In our example, assume that the agents are paid p= 16
for a completed job, so that each job is attractive and the manager is now dividing a good. The
allocation she proposed when the jobs were bads may no longer be fair when they are goods. This
is the case for the allocation in Table 3 that no longer satisfies Fair Share for agent a: his expected
utility equals 7
16
p  19
16
= 6  3
16
(he completes 1 · 1
4
+ 0 · 1
4
+ 3
8
· 1
2
= 7
16
of all the orders) while Fair
Share requires his utility to be at least p 4
2
= 6 (his expected utility from completing half of the
orders). As we see, our rules are not translation-invariant because we distribute unequal shares.3
Indeed, agent a receives the job with probability 7
16
, while b’s probability is 9
16
, and therefore adding
a constant p creates imbalance in their allocation by increasing a’s utility by 7
16
p and b’s by 9
16
p.
1.1. Overview of results and organization of the paper
We identify an object with a non-negative vector of dimension n, the number of agents. An instance
of our problem is a probability distribution over such vectors, which we call the prior. The object
is either a unanimously desirable good or a unanimously undesirable bad.
The input of a prior-dependent division rule is the realized (dis)utilities and the full description
of the prior. By contrast, the input of an almost prior-independent (API) rule is simply the vector
of normalized (dis)utilities (absolute over expected). Therefore, in addition to realized absolute
(dis)utilities, the rule only needs to know the expected (dis)utilities from the prior (and not even
that if agents report these ratios themselves).
The fairness of a rule is captured by a simple lower (upper) bound on the utilities (disutilities)
it distributes. The rule satisfies Fair Share if each agent is guaranteed at least 1
n
-th of his expected
utility for the whole good, or at most 1
n
-th of his expected disutility for the whole bad. We measure
e ciency by the sum of normalized utilities for a good and of normalized disutilities for a bad.
More comments on our definitions of fairness and e ciency are in Section 1.2.
As explained above, the Equal Split is the only fair and fully prior-independent rule. Our first
result is that much more e cient rules are available in the class of fair API rules. The simplest
2 For other unexpected di↵erences between the fair division of goods and bads, see Bogomolnaia et al. (2017) and
Bogomolnaia et al. (2019).
3 The di↵erence between goods and bads disappears in the class of allocations, where each agent receives exactly
the same sum of shares as in Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979). We do not impose such a restriction and allow for
allocations with unequal shares, i.e., unequal total probabilities of receiving one of the objects.
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example is the Proportional rule allocating a good in proportion to normalized utilities (and a bad
in proportion to inverse normalized disutilities); see Section 2.
In Section 3, we characterize the most e cient fair API rules for dividing a good. Optimality is
used in the following strong sense: one API rule dominates another if it generates at least as much
social welfare for each realization of the utilities. This relation is very demanding and therefore one
would expect that most pairs of fair API rules are incomparable, and that the set of undominated
rules must be large. This intuition is wrong. For two agents, a single rule, the Top-Heavy rule,
dominates every other fair API rule. For more than two agents there is a one-dimensional family
of undominated Top-Heavy rules (and so any fair API rule is dominated by at least one rule in the
family). We call these rules Top-Heavy because they favor the agents with high normalized utility
to the extent that the Fair Share requirement allows it.
The parallel analysis for the division of a bad in Section 4 yields sharper results. For any number
of agents there is a single Bottom Heavy rule dominating every other API fair rule. This rule favors
the agents with low normalized disutility as much as possible under Fair Share.
Sections 5 and 6 compare the e ciency of our Top-Heavy and Bottom-Heavy rules to that of
the most e cient prior-dependent rules. We start with the worst-case analysis in Section 5: the
worst case is with respect to all possible prior distributions of the vector of (dis)utilities. We focus
on two indices. The Competitive Ratio (CR) of a rule ' compares it to the Optimal fair prior-
dependent rule. For goods, CR is the worst-case ratio of the optimal social welfare to the social
welfare generated by '; as usual, CR is at least 1 for any '. For bads it is the ratio of the social
cost generated by ' to the optimal social cost. CR quantifies the e ciency loss implied by almost
prior-independence. The Price of Fairness (PoF) is defined similarly but now the rule is compared
to the rule maximizing the social welfare (or minimizing the social cost in the case of a bad) without
any fairness constraints. PoF quantifies the e ciency loss due to the fairness requirement.
Remarkably, we show that for any fair API rule, CR and PoF are equal, and so it is enough to
describe the results for PoF. In Example 1, we saw that the social cost of the Bottom-Heavy rule
was close to optimal. This is not a coincidence. For two agents, the PoF of the Top-Heavy rule for
a good is 109% and the PoF of the Bottom-Heavy rule for a bad is 112.5%; for the Proportional
rule, these numbers are 121% for a good and 200% for a bad. Thus the Top-Heavy and Bottom-
Heavy rules outperform the Proportional one, especially for a bad. As the number n of agents
grows, the PoFs of (some of) the Top-Heavy rules and the Bottom-Heavy rule grow as
p
n/2 and
n/4, respectively. Thus fairness becomes costly for API rules when then number of agents is large.
However, the PoF for the Optimal fair prior-dependent rule has the same asymptotic behavior (in
the case of a good, this was shown by Caragiannis et al. 2009); i.e., our API rules provide the same
worst-case guarantees as the prior-dependent rules.
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Section 6 complements the worst-case analysis by looking at the e ciency of our rules for par-
ticular prior distributions. We focus on a benchmark case, where individual (dis)utilities are sta-
tistically independent and drawn from familiar distributions, i.e., uniform, exponential, and so on.
While the worst-case results of Section 5 show that fairness becomes extremely costly for large n,
in the setting of Section 6 the Top-Heavy and Bottom-Heavy rules generate, independently of n, a
constant positive fraction of the optimal social welfare (of the social cost for a bad) unconstrained
by Fair Share. For example, if the distribution of individual utilities is uniform on [0,1], then the
unconstrained social welfare can only be 132% higher than that of the Top-Heavy rule even if the
number of agents is large; for the exponential distribution, we get 188%. This confirms the common
wisdom that allocation rules behave much better on average than in the worst case.
Section 7 discusses possible extensions of our model such as stronger fairness requirements,
asymmetric ownership rights, and dividing a mixture of goods and bads. Section 8 concludes.
Appendices A, B, and C contain many proofs.
1.2. Modeling choices
Fairness. The Fair Share requirement (aka proportional fairness) was introduced by Steinhaus
(1948) at the onset of the fair division literature: each agent should weakly prefer his allocation to
the Equal Split of the resources. It is a noncontroversial and fairly weak requirement. Two popular
strengthenings of Fair Share, Envy Freeness and Max-min fairness, can also be discussed in the
context of our model.
To define Envy Freeness in the case of a good, we fix the probability distribution on utility
profiles, and require, for any two agents i and j, that agent i’s expected utility from his share be no
less than his (agent i’s) expected utility from agent j’s share. This is a much tighter restriction on
API rules than Fair Share that severely reduces their e ciency; see the brief discussion in Section 7.
Max-min fairness looks for an allocation where the smallest of individual utilities (calibrated so
that interpersonal comparisons make sense) is maximized; see Ghodsi et al. (2011) and Bertsimas
et al. (2011). Our API rules are not well suited to maximizing the smallest normalized utility (or
minimizing the largest normalized disutility).
Normalization of utilities. Our definition of social welfare and social cost uses (dis)utilities nor-
malized by mean values. This allows interpersonal comparisons of utilities, such as the following:
this object is worth 40% more than average to Ann, but only 20% more to Bob. Normalization of
(dis)utilities is a familiar tool of normative economics and goes back to the concept of Egalitarian
Equivalence.4 Introduced by Pazner and Schmeidler (1978), it has been popular ever since in the
4 When a bundle ! of objects (goods or bads) is divided, Egalitarian Equivalence calibrates an agent’s absolute utility
u for the share z as the fraction   of ! such that u(z) = u( !); if u is homogeneous of degree 1, e.g., instance additive,
the calibrated utility is then u(z)u(!) . Our calibration can be recovered if we identify the random object with a bundle
! by interpreting the probability of a particular realization as its amount in the bundle.
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division literature (e.g., Brams and Taylor 1996, Bogomolnaia et al. 2019, Moulin 2019). In that
literature it is used to pursue Max-min fairness, while we use it to maximize (minimize) a utilitarian
objective: the sum of normalized (dis)utilities.
Normalizing utilities by their expected value is natural but not the only possible option. Another
familiar approach is to calibrate the range of the random utilities, from 0 in the worst outcome to
1 in the best: maximizing the sum of utilities thus calibrated, known as Relative Utilitarianism, is
the object of recent axiomatic work by Dhillon (1998), Dhillon and Mertens (1999), and Borgers
and Choo (2017).
We note finally that if individual (dis)utilities are measured in money and transferable across
agents, there is no need for further normalization and fairness is achieved by cash compensations.
Our division rules are useless in that context.
Strategic manipulations. The Proportional and our Top-Heavy and Bottom-Heavy rules are fair
only if they rely on the correct profile of (dis)utilities and their expected values. If these parameters
are not objectively measurable, they must be reported truthfully by the agents. As revelation
mechanisms, our division rules are not incentive compatible. Clearly, in the one-shot context of our
model, the only fair incentive-compatible division rule is the Equal Split, which ignores utilities
altogether.
1.3. More relevant literature
Starting with Diamond’s well-known paradox (Diamond 1967), the microeconomic literature on
fairness under uncertainty focuses on the trade-o↵ between ex post and ex ante fairness in the
context of public decision making and discusses ways of adapting the social welfare approach to
capture this tension: notable contributions include Broome (1984), Ben-Porath et al. (1997), and
Gadjos and Maurin (2004).
Myerson (1981) initiates the discussion of fair division under uncertainty, in the axiomatic bar-
gaining model: there as in our model agents are risk neutral and ex ante fairness allows significant
e ciency gains, the same ones our rules are designed to capture.
The design of our division rules handling only a very limited amount of information is method-
ologically close to the design of prior-independent (Devanur et al. 2011) and prior-free (Hartline
et al. 2001) auctions and the application of robust optimization to contract theory (Caroll 2015).
There as here, in contrast to the classic Bayesian approach where the manager knows the prior
distribution, either no information about the prior is available at all or it is known that the prior
belongs to a certain wide class of distributions. And, there as here, the optimal worst-case behavior
is the main design objective.
Our model is static, yet we can interpret it as an allocation decision taken multiple times, which
justifies the use of ex ante fairness, i.e., fairness in expectation (see also the discussion of Example 1
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in the Introduction). This interpretation links our setting and the active current research about
“online” resource allocation, dealing with sequential allocative decisions when future resources are
uncertain, e.g., Karp et al. (1990), Feldman et al. (2009), and Devanur et al. (2019). Our notion of
the Competitive Ratio is inspired by the competitive analysis common to this literature (Borodin
and Yaniv 2005).
Online fair division is a very recent topic, adding fairness concerns to the standard e ciency
objectives of online resource allocation. However, most of the papers on online fair division either
ignore the e ciency objective entirely and focus exclusively on fairness (Benade et al. 2018),
or they consider both objectives but impose strong simplifying assumptions on the structure of
preferences (Aleksandrov et al. 2015). The two papers closest to ours are the follow-up works by
Zeng and Psomas (2019) and Gkatzelis et al. (2020). The first one looks at the fairness/e ciency
trade-o↵ when the allocation rule competes against an increasingly adversarial nature. One of their
settings (i.i.d. goods with known distribution) reduces to our static problem, and the rule they
come up with can be seen as the Optimal fair prior-dependent rule, where fairness is interpreted
as Envy Freeness. The second paper considers a non-probabilistic setting, where the utilities are
determined by an adversary, however, the sum of the utilities over periods is known to the manager.
This requirement is parallel to our assumption of known expected values. Despite this similarity,
characterization of optimal rules in the setting of Gkatzelis et al. (2020) turns out to be problematic
even in the two-agent case.
2. The model
Definitions 1 to 6 apply to the division of a good or a bad.
Definition 1. A fair division problem P = (N,µ,X) is described by the fixed set N =
{1,2, . . . , n} of agents, the probability distribution µ over the positive orthant RN+ , and the ran-
dom variable X in RN+ with distribution µ. We always assume that the expectations Eµ(Xi) are
bounded and positive for each i.
We interpret Xi, i 2 N , as agent i’s random utility or disutility and impose no additional
restriction on the probability space or the distribution of X: (dis)utilities Xi may be arbitrarily
correlated across agents.
We write X⇤i =
1
Eµ(Xi)
Xi for agent i’s normalized utility or disutility. We assume that upon the
arrival of each object, the corresponding profile X⇤ of normalized (dis)utilities is revealed: it is the
input of our division rules. In other words, the rule learns how lucky or unlucky each agent is to
receive the object that just appeared.
Definition 2. A (prior-dependent) division rule ' is a collection of measurable mappings 'µ
from RN+ to the simplex  (N) of lotteries over N , one for each prior distribution µ. Given a
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division problem P = (N,µ,X) and a realization x⇤ 2RN+ of the normalized (dis)utility profile X⇤,
agent i gets the share 'µi (x
⇤) of the object.
Here “dividing the object” can be interpreted either literally if the object is divisible, or as
assigning probabilistic shares, or time shares.
Definition 3. A division rule ' is almost prior-independent (API) if it does not depend on µ,
i.e., 'µ ='µ
0
for all distributions µ and5 µ0. For API rules we will drop the superscript µ.
We focus on rules that treat agents similarly, i.e., satisfy symmetry.
Definition 4. A rule is symmetric if a permutation of the agents permutes their shares accord-
ingly. Formally, for any distribution µ, vector x 2 RN+ , agent i 2 N , and any permutation ⇡ of
N , we have 'µi (x) = '
⇡(µ)
⇡(i) (⇡(x)), where ⇡(x) and ⇡(µ) are obtained from x and µ by permuting
coordinates: ⇡(x)⇡(j) = xj, j 2N , and ⇡(µ)(⇡(A)) = µ(A), for any measurable set A and ⇡(A) =
{⇡(y) : y 2A}.
The fairness constraint sets a lower (resp. upper) bound on every agent’s expected utility (resp.
disutility).
Definition 5. The division rule ' guarantees Fair Share (FS) if every agent’s expected
(dis)utility is at least (at most) 1
n
-th of his expected (dis)utility for the entire object. If the object
is a good, this means for each division problem P and each agent i2N ,
Eµ ('µi (X⇤) ·X⇤i ) 
1
n
. (1)
The inequality is reversed if we divide a bad.
We define expected social welfare (the expected social cost in the case of a bad) as the expected
sum of normalized (dis)utilities
S(',P) =Eµ
X
i2N
'
µ
i (X
⇤) ·X⇤i
!
. (2)
Our design goal, conditional upon satisfying Fair Share, is to maximize S(',P) in the case of a
good, or to minimize this quantity in the case of a bad.
Both of our design objectives (1) and (2) are invariant with respect to rescaling of (dis)utilities.
Since our division rules also depend on normalized (dis)utilities, in the rest of the paper we can
restrict attention to those problems where X and X⇤ coincide.
Definition 6. We call the problem P normalized if Eµ(Xi) = 1 for all i2N .
5 In practice, it is reasonable to assume that the realized vector of (dis)utilities X is observed directly, while the
normalized (dis)utilities X⇤i =
Xi
Eµ(Xi)
are derived from it. Hence, in order to apply an API rule one still needs to know
the expected values.
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All proofs are given for normalized problems and extend automatically to general problems by
replacing everywhere Xi by X⇤i =
1
Eµ(Xi)
Xi.
Notation. Throughout the paper we use the following notation. For a vector x2RN and a subset
M ✓N , the sum of coordinates over M is denoted by xM =
P
j2M xj. By e
M 2RN , we denote the
indicator vector of a subset M ⇢N , i.e., eMi = 1 if i2M and eMi = 0 if i /2M . Finally x  y means
xi > yi for all i.
2.1. Three benchmark API rules
The Equal Split rule, 'es(x) = 1
n
e
N for all x, is the simplest API rule of all, and it implements Fair
Share. Not surprisingly, its e ciency is poor.
On the other extreme, we have the Utilitarian rule 'ut(x) = e
M
|M | , where M = {i 2 N : xi =
maxj2N xj} for a good and M = {i2N : xi =minj2N xj} for a bad. This rule achieves the optimal
welfare level by allocating the object among agents with highest (lowest) normalized (dis)utilities.
However, it drastically violates FS: in a two-agent normalized problem with a good, where X =
(1,1+") with probability (1 ") and (1,") with probability ", the expected utility of the first agent
E ('ut1 (X)X1) = " is below his fair share of 12 for any "2
 
0, 1
2
 
.
A natural compromise between these two rules is the Proportional rule, which is defined as
follows:
for a good: 'proi (x) =
xi
xN
, if x 6= 0, and 'pro(0) = e
N
n
for a bad: 'proi (x) =
1
xiP
j2N
1
xj
, if x  0, and 'pro(x) = e
M
|M | , where M = {i2N : xi = 0} 6=?.
The next proposition shows that the Proportional rule also guarantees FS and generates a higher
social welfare than 'es in the following strong ex post sense.
Definition 7. Fix two API rules ' and  . We say that ' dominates  if it always generates
ex post (for every realization of the normalized utilities) at least as much social welfare, and
sometimes strictly more. Formally, in the case of a good,
X
i2N
i(x) ·xi 
X
i2N
'i(x) ·xi for all x2RN+ , with a strict inequality for some x. (3)
In the case of a bad, the inequalities are reversed.
Proposition 1. The Proportional rule guarantees Fair Share and dominates the Equal Split
both for a good and for a bad.
Proof for a good. Suppose that P is normalized. To prove FS, apply the Cauchy–Schwartz
inequality to the two variables X
2
i
XN
and XN : Eµ
⇣
X2i
XN
⌘
· Eµ(XN)   (EµXi)2. Now the left-most
expectation is simply Eµ('proi (X) ·Xi), agent i’s expected utility, while by the normalization the
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other two terms are respectively n and 1. Next, the weak domination condition (3) reads as xN
n

P
i2N x
2
i
xN
, which is equivalent to the inequality between arithmetic and quadratic means: xN
n
qP
i2N x
2
i
n
. If x is not proportional to eN , the inequality becomes strict.
Proof for a bad. Agent i’s expected utility under 'pro is now Eµ ('proi (X) ·Xi) =
Eµ
✓
1P
j2N
1
Xj
◆
= 1
n
Eµ( eX), where ex denotes the harmonic mean of the xi’s. FS then follows from
the inequality ex xN
n
between harmonic and arithmetic means. The weak domination condition (3)
boils down to the same inequality, which, as in the case of a good, becomes strict whenever x is
not proportional to eN . ⇤
For a good, the ratio
P
i2N '
pro
i (x)·xiP
i2N '
es
i (x)·xi
can be as high as n, while for a bad the ratio
P
i2N '
es
i (x)·xiP
i2N '
pro
i (x)·xi
can be arbitrarily large. For example, take x= e{1} for a good and x= "e{1} + eN {1}, where " is
arbitrarily small, for a bad.
One can try to achieve greater e ciency than the Proportional rule does by assigning proba-
bilities to agents in proportion (or inverse proportion) to some strictly higher power q > 1 of their
normalized (dis)utilities, but such rules fail FS.6 In the next two sections we construct fair API
rules with higher performance than 'pro.
3. Goods: The family of undominated API rules
Our first main result (Theorem 1 below) describes the set of undominated API rules in the sense
of Definition 7.
3.1. Characterizing fairness for a good
The key step toward Theorem 1 characterizes the restriction imposed by Fair Share on any API
rule '. Given a vector x in RN+ , we write its arithmetic average as x=
xN
n
.
Proposition 2. A symmetric API rule ' dividing a good satisfies Fair Share if and only if
there exists a number ✓, 0 ✓ 1, such that
'i(x) max
⇢
1
n
+
✓
n  1
✓
1  x
xi
◆
, 0
 
for all i2N and x2RN+ (4)
(where we use 1
0
=+1).
Proof of the “if” statement. Assume that the division rule ' for a good satisfies (4); then
'i(x) ·xi  
1
n
xi +
✓
n  1(xi  x) for all x.
For an arbitrary normalized problem P (Definition 6), we have Eµ(Xi  X) = 0 and the inequal-
ity (1) follows.
6 Suppose that we divide a good and µ picks, for each i  2, the vector xi = e{1} +(n  1)e{i} with probability 1n 1 .
Then the expected utility of agent 1 is 11+(n 1)q , which is below
1
n for n  3. The proof for a bad is similar.
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Proof of the “only if” statement. Assume that the rule ' satisfies Fair Share and define the
real-valued function f(x) ='1(x) ·x1. By the symmetry of ', we get f(eN) = 1n . Consider a convex
combination in RN+ , with an arbitrary number of terms, such that
PK
k=1 µky
k = eN . The problem
P in which X = yk with probability µk is normalized and FS implies
KX
k=1
µkf(y
k)  1
n
= f(eN).
Recall that the convexification g of f is the pointwise-maximal convex function such that g(x)
f(x) for all x. Alternatively, g(x) can be represented as
g(x) = inf
n KX
k=1
µkf(y
k)
o
, (5)
where the infimum is over all7 convex combinations such that
PK
k=1 µky
k = x; e.g. Laraki (2004,
Proposition 1.1).
The above inequality implies g(eN)  f(eN) and the opposite inequality is true by the definition
of g, and so g(eN) = f(eN). Because g is convex and finite at eN there exists a vector ↵ 2 RN
supporting its graph at (eN , g(eN)), i.e., such that for all x 2 RN+ : g(x)   g(eN) + ↵ · (x   eN).
Therefore,
f(x) ='1(x) ·x1  
1
n
+↵ · (x  eN).
Figure 1 The geometric intuition behind the proof of Proposition 2. Right figure: the convexification of a
function f coincides with f at x= e if the graph of f is supported by a linear function. The left figure illustrates
the necessity of this condition.
Apply the inequality above to x=  eN for any  > 0. By the symmetry of ' we get
1
n
   1
n
+(   1)↵ · eN for any  > 0.
7 By the Caratheodory theorem (Rockafellar 1970, Theorem 17.1), it is enough to take the infimum in (5) over
convex combinations with at most n+1 points. This allows us to strengthen the “only if” part of Proposition 2: the
bound (4) holds if the rule ' satisfies FS in all problems with at most n+1 goods.
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Pushing   to +1 and to +0 yields two opposite inequalities: 1
n
  ↵ ·eN and ↵ ·eN   1
n
, respectively.
Therefore, ↵ · eN = 1
n
and '1(x) ·x1   ↵ ·x for all x.
Again, the symmetry of ' implies that we can take ↵j = ↵i for all i, j   2. Indeed, if x0 results
from x by permuting coordinates i and j, we have
'1(x) ·x1 ='1(x0) ·x1  
1
2
(↵ ·x+↵ ·x0) = e↵ ·x,
where e↵i = e↵j and e↵ · eN = 1n are preserved.
Set   = ↵i for all i  2. Since '1(x) belongs to [0,1], we obtain the following chain of inequalities:
x1   '1(x) ·x1   ↵1x1   xN {1}. Keeping x1 bounded and pushing xN {1} to infinity, we get that
this chain of inequalities can hold only if     0. Combining this with ↵ · eN = 1
n
we see that
'1(x) ·x1   ↵ ·x=
1
n
x1 + ((n  1)x1  xN {1}).
Changing the parameter   to  = n  gives
'i(x) 
1
n
+  
✓
1  x
xi
◆
for all x2RN+
and i= 1. For the remaining agents i2N \{1}, this bound with the same   follows by the symmetry
of ': if x and x0 di↵er by permuting coordinates of 1 and i, then '1(x0) ='i(x).
It remains to find the bounds on   derived from the fact that '(x) is in  (N). For all x  0,
the above inequality and '(x)  0 imply
X
i2N
max
⇢
1
n
+  
✓
1  x
xi
◆
,0
 
 1 for all x2RN+ , (6)
which is equivalent to the following property:
for all M ✓N :
X
i2M
✓
1
n
+  
✓
1  x
xi
◆◆
= |M |
✓
1
n
+  
◆
   x
X
i2M
1
xi
!
 1 for all x2RN+ .
By the inequality between harmonic and arithmetic means,
P
i2M xi
|M |  
|M |P
i2M
1
xi
. Since x  1
n
P
i2M xi,
the infimum of x(
P
i2M
1
xi
) is |M |
2
n
, which is achieved for any x parallel to eM ; therefore,
|M |
✓
1
n
+  
◆
 1+   |M |
2
n
()
✓
1  |M |
n
◆
( |M |  1) 0
and we conclude that   1
n 1 . This gives the desired inequality (4) by setting ✓= (n  1) . ⇤
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3.2. Undominated rules for a good: The Top-Heavy family
Armed with Proposition 2, we can now easily identify the undominated API division rules (Defi-
nition 7) satisfying FS for goods.
For any x2RN+ , we write (x(1), . . . , x(n)) for the order statistics8 of x, and ⌧(x) = {i2N |xi = x(n)}
for the set of agents with the largest utility.
We fix ✓, 0< ✓ 1, and define the Top-Heavy rule '✓ by placing as much weight on the agents
from ⌧(x) as inequalities (4) permit.
Definition 8. For 0< ✓ 1, the Top-Heavy (TH) rule '✓ is given by
'
✓
i (x) =
8
>>>><
>>>>:
max
⇢
1
n
+
✓
n  1
✓
1  x
xi
◆
, 0
 
, i2N ⌧(x)
1
|⌧(x)|
0
@1 
X
j2N ⌧(x)
'
✓
j(x)
1
A , i2 ⌧(x)
. (7)
Thus all agents except those with the highest values receive the share '✓i (x), which is equal to the
lower bound (4), while the agents with the highest values equally split the rest.
Inequality (6) guarantees that the shares received by the agents with the highest values are non-
negative. It also implies that the i-sequence of shares '✓i (x) is co-monotonic with that of utilities
xi, i.e., xk   xi implies9 '✓k(x) '✓i (x).
The rule '✓ converges to Equal Split when ✓ goes to zero, but Equal Split is clearly dominated
by any rule '✓ for ✓> 0. This is why we excluded 0 from the range of ✓.
Note that the discontinuity of |⌧(x)| implies that for n  3, all rules '✓ are discontinuous at any
x where at least two agents, but not all, have the highest utility (x(1) < x(n 1) = x(n)). For two
agents, the TH rule is continuous.
Example 2 (the TH rule '
1
for two agents). For two-agent problems, the rule '1 has a
simple expression. By symmetry it is enough to define it when x1  x2:
'
1(x) =
(
(0,1), x1
x2
 1
2⇣
1  x2
2x1
,
x2
2x1
⌘
,
1
2
 x1
x2
 1 . (8)
The dependence of '11 on
x1
x2
is depicted in Figure 2.
8 The vector with the same set of coordinates as x, rearranged in increasing order.
9 This is clear if we compare the shares of two agents i, k outside ⌧(x); if i /2 ⌧(x) and k 2 ⌧(x), inequality '✓i (x)'✓k(x)
is
|⌧(x)|'✓i (x)+
X
j2N ⌧(x)
'
✓
j (x) 1,
which follows from '✓i (x) =max{ 1n +  (1 
x
xi
),0} and (6).
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Figure 2 The amount of a good received by the first agent under the TH rule '1 for two agents as a function
of the ratio t= x1x2 . If the ratio is below
1
2 or above 2, the TH rule coincides with the Utilitarian one, which gives
the whole good to an agent with the highest value. If the normalized utilities are closer, both agents receive a
non-zero amount of the good: '1 = 1  12t on
⇥
1
2 ,1
⇤
and '1 = 12 t on [1,2].
Theorem 1 (for goods).
i ) For any n  2, every symmetric API rule satisfying Fair Share is dominated by, or equal to,
one Top-Heavy rule '✓, 0< ✓ 1.
ii ) If n= 2, the Top-Heavy rule '1 dominates every other Top-Heavy rule '✓, 0< ✓< 1.
iii ) If n  3, the Top-Heavy rules '✓, 0< ✓ 1, are undominated.
iv ) For n  3, the Proportional rule is dominated by the Top Heavy rule 'n 1n , but not by any
other rule '✓.
Proof of statement i) Fix an API rule ' satisfying FS. There is a ✓, 0 ✓  1, such that the
inequalities (4) hold for all i and x (Proposition 2). If ✓ = 0, our rule is Equal Split, which we
already noticed is dominated by each rule '✓. If ✓> 0, these inequalities imply 'i(x) '✓i (x) for all
x and all i /2 ⌧(x). Hence ('i(x) '✓i (x))xi  ('i(x) '✓i (x))x(n) for all i /2 ⌧(x). Summing up these
inequalities and adding
P
j2⌧(x)('i(x) '✓i (x))xj on both sides gives the desired weak inequalities
in (3). If none of the inequalities in (3) is strict, we deduce 'i(x) ='✓i (x) for all x and all i /2 ⌧(x)
such that xi > 0. If there is some i such that xi = 0 and 'i(x)> 0 (while '✓i (x) = 0) then '(x) has
less weight to distribute on ⌧(x) than '✓, contradicting our assumption. Because ' is symmetric,
we conclude that '(x) ='✓(x).
Proof of statement ii) Fix ✓ < ✓0 and x1  x2. The formula (7) implies '✓1(x)  '✓
0
1 (x) because
the coe cient of ✓ in '✓1(x) is
1
2
(1  x2
x1
) 0. Hence, under '✓0 , the low-value agent 1 receives the
good with lower probability than under '✓. This yields inequality (3) and, for 1
2
<
x1
x2
< 1, it is
strict. Thus '1 dominates '✓ for ✓< 1. Note that this argument does not extend to the case n  3
because if agent i’s utility is neither the smallest nor the largest, the sign of the coe cient of ✓ in
'
✓
i (x) is ambiguous.
17
Proof of statement iii) We check now that no TH rule '✓ dominates another TH rule '✓
0
.
Assume that 0< ✓ < ✓0 and consider first the profile xi =
3
4
if i 6= n and xn = 1+ n 14 . Then x= 1
and all coordinates of '✓i (x) and '
✓0
i (x) are strictly positive. Compute '
✓
i (x) '✓
0
i (x) =
✓0 ✓
3(n 1) > 0
for all i 6= n, and so '✓0 generates more surplus at x than '✓.
To show an instance of the reverse comparison, we choose x1 =
✓
3
, xi = 1+
3
4 
✓
3
n 2 for 2 i n  1,
and xn =
5
4
. Thus x= 1 and x< xi <xn for 2 i n  1. This implies '✓1(x) ='✓
0
1 (x) = 0, '
✓
i (x)<
'
✓0
i (x), and '
✓
n(x)>'
✓0
i (x).
Proof of statement iv) In the proof of statement i), we showed that the rule ' is dominated by
'
✓ if it satisfies inequalities (4). Thus the rule 'pro is dominated by the TH rule '✓ if and only if
for all x2RN+ and i2N we have
xi
xN
  1
n
+
✓
n  1
✓
1  x
xi
◆
() xi
xN
+
✓ ·xN
n(n  1)xi
  1
n
+
✓
n  1 .
By the inequality between arithmetic and geometric means, xi
xN
+ ✓·xN
n(n 1)xi
  2
q
✓
n(n 1) and this
lower bound is attained on x such that xi
xN
=
q
✓
n(n 1) . Therefore, '
pro is dominated by '✓ if and
only if 2
q
✓
n(n 1)  
1
n
+ ✓
n 1 . We see that the geometric mean of
1
n
and ✓
n 1 exceeds their arithmetic
mean, which is only possible if the two means coincide with 1
n
and ✓
n 1 , respectively. Thus '
pro is
dominated by '✓ only for ✓= n 1
n
. ⇤
4. Bads: The unique undominated API rule
We adapt the approach developed in the previous section in order to characterize the undominated
(Definition 7) API fair rules for a bad.
Surprisingly, in this case the dominating rule is unique even for n  3.
4.1. Characterizing fairness for a bad
We state the counterpart of Proposition 2 for a bad. The proof is in Appendix A.
Proposition 3. A symmetric API rule ' dividing a bad satisfies Fair Share if and only if there
exists a number ✓, 0 ✓ 1, such that
'i(x)min
⇢
1
n
+
✓
n  1
✓
x
xi
  1
◆
, 1
 
for all i2N and x2RN+ (9)
(where we set 1
0
=+1).
4.2. The undominated Bottom-Heavy rule for a bad
We can now use inequality (9) to construct, as in the previous section, the canonical Bottom-
Heavy rule '1, which corresponds to ✓ = 1. The construction relies on the same order statistics
(x(1), . . . , x(n)), but is slightly more involved. We write  (x; t) = {i2N | xi = x(t)} (and so  (x;n) =
⌧(x)) and use the convention x(0) = 1 and  (x, t) =? for t > n.
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The BH rule places as much weight on the smallest disutilities as permitted by (9). For ✓ = 1,
the right-hand side of (9) simplifies to 1
n
+ ✓
n 1(
x
xi
  1) = 1
n(n 1)
xN {i}
xi
and we get the following
expression.
Definition 9. The Bottom-Heavy (BH) rule '1 is defined by
'
1
i (x) =
8
>>>>>><
>>>>>>:
1
n(n  1)
xN {i}
xi
, i : xi  x(et)
1
| (x;et+1)|
0
@1  1
n(n  1)
X
i:xix(
et)
xN {i}
xi
1
A , i2  (x;et+1)
0, otherwise
, (10)
where et is the maximal t= 0,1,2, . . . , n such that 1
n(n 1)
P
i:xix(t)
xN {i}
xi
 1.
In other words, agents are weakly ordered by their values and the longest possible prefix of
low-value agents (permitted by the feasibility condition '1 2 (N)) receives shares equal to the
upper bound (4); agents next to that prefix split the rest equally, and all others get nothing.
Note that for all vectors x except those parallel to eN we have 1
n(n 1)
P
i2N
xN {i}
xi
> 1 and thus
et n  1. Indeed, the minimum of
P
i2N
xN {i}
xi
over RN+ is n(n  1), and it is achieved by any x
parallel to eN , and only by those: for such a vector, et= n and '1(x) = eN
n
.
If et= 0 the only agents with a positive share are those in  (x; 1), who have the smallest disutility,
and so '1 selects an optimal utilitarian allocation.
Symmetrically to the case of goods, the sequence of shares '1i (x) is anti-monotonic to the
sequence of disutilities xi.
Example 3 (the BH rule '
1
for two agents). If n = 2, the BH rule '1 for bads is the
mirror image of the dominant TH rule '1 (8):
'
1(x) =
(
(1,0), x1
x2
 1
2⇣
x2
2x1
, 1  x2
2x1
⌘
,
1
2
 x1
x2
 1 .
Figure 3 The share of the first agent under the BH rule '1 for two agents as a function of x1x2 .
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Theorem 2 (for bads). For any n  2, the Bottom-Heavy rule '1 dominates every other sym-
metric API rule for bads satisfying Fair Share.
In Appendix A we define a family of BH rules '✓, ✓ 2 [0,1] and first show, as in the case of goods,
that any other rule is dominated by some '✓; then we check that '1 dominates '✓ for ✓< 1. This
additional domination argument within the family of BH rules '✓ is straightforward but lengthy.
5. Worst-case performances
Notation. We write   for the set of symmetric almost prior-dependent rules ',  (FS) for rules '2
  satisfying Fair Share, and  ind(FS) for symmetric rules '2 (FS). Thus  ind(FS)⇢ (FS)⇢
 . Let ⇧n be the set of normalized problems with n agents. Finally we recall that S(',P) denotes
the expected social welfare (expected social cost); see (2).
Definition 10. The Competitive Ratio10 (CR) of an API rule '2 ind(FS) is defined as follows:
for a good: CRn(') = sup
P2⇧n
sup
2 (FS)
S( ,P)
S(',P) for a bad: CRn(') = supP2⇧n
sup
2 (FS)
S(',P)
S( ,P) .
The CR identifies the worst-case loss in the social welfare caused by almost prior-independence.
For a good and a rule ' 2  (FS), we write ⇡(',P) for the ratio of the optimal unconstrained
social welfare generated by the Utilitarian rule to the social welfare generated by '. For a bad, it
is the ratio of the social cost generated by ' to the optimal social cost:
for a good: ⇡(',P) = Eµ (maxiXi)
S(',P) for a bad: ⇡(',P) =
S(',P)
Eµ (miniXi)
.
The Price of Fairness (PoF) of '2 (FS) is the worst possible ratio ⇡(',P):
PoFn(') = sup
P2⇧n
⇡(',P)  1.
Lemma 1. If the API rule '2 ind(FS) divides a good, we have
CRn(') = PoFn(') = sup
x2RN+
maxi xiP
i2N 'i(x) ·xi
.
If '2 ind(FS) divides a bad, we have
CRn(') = PoFn(') = sup
x2RN+
P
i2N 'i(x) ·xi
mini xi
.
10 The term “competitive ratio” is borrowed from the literature on online algorithms: there it is defined as a worst-
case factor by which the value of the objective (the social welfare in our model) for an online rule is less than the
value achieved by the best o✏ine rule, where the manager has full knowledge of the future.
Our model can be interpreted as online allocation problem with i.i.d. objects; see Section 1.3. Under this inter-
pretation our definition of competitive ratio matches the traditional one. Knowing the future reduces to knowing
the empirical distribution of the future sequence of values, which in an i.i.d. environment with a large number of
repetitions converges to the prior. Thus the best o✏ine rule becomes just the best prior-dependent rule in the long
run.
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Proposition 4 (for goods).
i ) The CRn of any rule '2 ind(FS) is at most n; the CRn of Equal Split is exactly n.
ii ) The CRn of the Proportional rule is
p
n
2
+ 1
2
. For instance, 121% for n= 2.
iii ) The CRn of the Top-Heavy rule '✓ is decreasing in ✓. Moreover:
CRn('
1) =
n
2
p
n  1
=
p
n
2
+
1
4
+O
✓
1p
n
◆
,
CRn('
✓) =
n
2
p
(n  1+ ✓)✓+1  2✓
 CRn('1).
For instance, CR2('1)' 109% for n= 2.
iv ) The smallest PoFn of a prior-dependent rule in  (FS) is such that
n
2
p
n  1
  inf
'2 (FS)
PoFn(') 
n
2
p
n  1
2
=
p
n
2
+
1
8
+O
✓
1p
n
◆
.
For n= 2 it is 108%.
Statements iii) and iv), together with Lemma 1, make clear that the PoFn of the TH rule '1 is
essentially the best PoFn of any fair prior-dependent rule.
Proposition 5 (for bads).
i ) The CRn of Equal Split is unbounded (for any fixed n) and that of the Proportional rule is n.
ii ) The CRnof the Bottom-Heavy rule '1 is such that
n
4
+
5
4
 CRn('1) 
n
4
+
1
2
+
1
4n
.
It is 109% for n= 2.
iii ) The smallest PoFnof a prior-dependent rule in  (FS) is
inf
'2 (FS)
PoFn(') =
n
4
+
1
2
+
1
4n
.
For n= 2 it is 108%.
Again, the last two statements and Lemma 1 imply that the PoFn of the BH rule '1 is essentially
the best PoFn of any fair prior-dependent rule.
All three results (Lemma 1 and Propositions 5 and 6) are proved in Appendix B.
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6. Asymptotic performance for standard distributions
We evaluate the performance of the TH, BH, and Proportional rules in the benchmark setting
where the number of agents is large and their values are given by independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) random variables.
We will see that in this setting the TH rules behave significantly better than under the worst-
case assumption of Section 5. In fact they keep a constant fraction of the optimal social welfare
even for a large number of agents. The conclusion is almost the same for the BH rule, except for
a certain subclass of distributions with support touching zero, for which the social cost can exceed
the optimal social cost by a factor of O(
p
n) (still much better than O(n) in the worst case). The
Proportional rule does much worse in several natural i.i.d. contexts detailed below.
Fix a distribution ⌫ 2  (R+) with unit mean and assume that the vector X = (Xi)i=1,...,n of
values is distributed according to µ=⌦ni=1⌫; i.e., the values are independent random variables with
distribution ⌫. The corresponding problem Pn(⌫) is normalized.
In Appendix C we derive the somewhat cumbersome general formulas describing the ratio
⇡(',Pn(⌫)) when n is large. Here we discuss examples and corollaries of the general results.
6.1. A good
6.1.1. Bounded support: ⌫ is the uniform distribution on [0,1]. In this case the TH
rule '1 and the Proportional rule 'pro have similar performances.
For n= 2, the TH almost achieves the optimal welfare level. The Proportional rule is 10% behind:
simple computations show that ⇡('1,P2(uni[0,1])) = 85+4 ln2 ⇡ 1.03 and ⇡('
pro
,P2(uni[0,1])) =
2
ln2 1 ⇡ 1.13. Compare these numbers with the worst-case guarantees from Proposition 4:
PoF2('pro) =
p
2+1
2
⇡ 1.21 and PoF2('1) = 22p2 1 ⇡ 1.09. We see that the Proportional rule gener-
ates less social welfare for the uniform distribution than the TH rule for any distribution.
For n!1, Proposition 6 from Appendix C and Lemma 3 below imply that the ratios for our
two rules converge and the limit values are
⇡('1,P1(uni[0,1])) =
1
1
16
+ ln2
⇡ 1.32 and ⇡('pro,P1(uni[0,1])) = 1.5.
This result is in sharp contrast with the worst-case behavior (Section 5): there are problems P
with n agents such that the TH rule generates only a 2/
p
n fraction of the optimal social welfare.
Our next result generalizes this observation.
6.1.2. The TH rule keeps a positive fraction of the optimal social welfare. This holds
in general, not just in the above example. Fix a distribution ⌫ with mean 1 and with non-zero
average absolute deviation D(⌫) =
R
|x  1|d⌫(x). Note that D(⌫) is at most 2.
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Lemma 2. If ⌫ has mean 1 and a finite moment
R
R+
x
 
d⌫(x) for some   > 2, then the ratio for
the TH rule converges to a limit value that satisfies the following upper bound:
⇡('1,P1(⌫))
2
D
+
4
D2
. (11)
If in addition ⌫ has unbounded support, then
⇡('1,P1(⌫)) 
1
D
. (12)
The proof is in Appendix C. For instance, if ⌫ is the exponential distribution we have
⇡('1,P1(exp)) =
1
1  2e  12  Ei( 1/2)
⇡ 2.88,
where Ei stands for a special function, the exponential integral.11 Contrast this with the situation
for the Proportional rule.
Lemma 3. Under the assumptions of Lemma 2,
⇡('pro,Pn(⌫)) =
Eµ (maxiXi)
E⌫(X1)2
(1+ o(1)), as n!1,
(where an = o(1) means that an ! 0, as n!1).
Indeed, by the law of large numbers,
S('pro,Pn(⌫)) =Eµ
X
i2N
Xi'
pro
i (X)
!
= n ·Eµ
✓
(X1)2P
i2N Xi
◆
 !Eµ
✓
(X1)2
EµX1
◆
=E⌫(X1)2.
Lemma 3 implies that ⇡('pro,P1(⌫)) tends to +1 if ⌫ has unbounded support, because
EµmaxiXi tends to infinity. For instance, ⇡('pro,Pn(exp)) = lnn2 (1+ o(1)).
Of course, this limit is finite if the support of ⌫ is bounded.
6.2. A bad
When a bad is divided, the performance of the BH and Proportional rules is determined by the
behavior of the distribution at the left-most point of the support. Both rules generate a bounded
multiple of the optimal social cost when 0 does not belong to the support of ⌫; the BH rule also
does well when ⌫ has a non-zero density at 0. However, both rules have poor performance if the
support touches 0 but ⌫ has not enough “weight” near 0. Here we give three examples to illustrate
the general asymptotic results of Appendix C.
11 Ei(x) = 
R1
 x
e t
t dt.
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6.2.1. The support does not touch zero: ⌫ is uniform on [ 1
2
,
3
2
]. By Proposition 7 in
Appendix C, the ratios for the BH and Proportional rules converge to limit values that are pretty
close to each other:
⇡
✓
'
1
,P1
✓
uni

1
2
,
3
2
 ◆◆
= e  1⇡ 1.72 and ⇡
✓
'
pro
,P1
✓
uni

1
2
,
3
2
 ◆◆
=
2
ln3
⇡ 1.82.
6.2.2. The support touches zero but there is not enough weight around it: ⌫ has
density 3
4
x(2  x) on [0,2]. For this distribution, the optimal social cost tends to zero while the
losses of the BH and Proportional rules remain positive. Proposition 7 shows that the ratios for
both rules tend to infinity at the speed of
p
n, while the ratio for the BH rule remains 1p
3
⇡ 0.58
times lower than that for the Proportional one:
⇡('1,Pn(⌫)) =
2
3
p
⇡
p
n(1+ o(1)) = ⇡('pro,Pn(⌫))
1p
3
(1+ o(1)).
6.2.3. The distribution has non-zero density at 0 (e.g., ⌫ is uniform on [0,2]). In this
case, the BH rule outperforms the Proportional one in the limit.
Lemma 4. Assume that the distribution ⌫ has a continuous density f on an interval [0, a] and
f(0)> 0. Then ⇡('1,Pn(⌫)) converges to a finite limit as n becomes large, whereas ⇡('pro,Pn(⌫)) =
⌦
⇣
n
ln(n)
⌘
as12 n!1.
A similar result for the case where the density is infinite at x= 0 is the subject of Lemma 5 in
Appendix C.
The statement about the BH rule follows from the asymptotic result for the order statistic: the
expected values of X(k) for small numbers k are equal to k
f(0)·n(1 + o(1)) as
13
n!1. Therefore,
on average, only a bounded number of agents with the smallest Xi receive a non-zero portion of a
bad, which implies that the ratio is bounded away from infinity.
For the Proportional rule, we have S('pro,Pn(⌫)) = n ·E
✓
1P
k
1
X(k)
◆
. For large n, we can estimate
the denominator from below by the harmonic series; taking into account that E(X(1)) = 1
f(0)·n(1+
o(1)) we get the desired asymptotic formula.
7. Extensions
Envy-Freeness
An alternative, much more demanding interpretation of fairness in our model is (ex ante) Envy-
Freeness, which means, in the case of a good:
Eµ('µi (X⇤) ·X⇤i ) Eµ('
µ
j (X
⇤) ·X⇤i ) for all i, j and P = (N,µ,X).
12 Recall that an =⌦(bn) if there exist n0 and C > 0 such that |an| C|bn| for all n  n0.
13 The order statistic X(k) has the same distribution as F 1(Y (k)), where F is the distribution function of ⌫ and Yi,
i2N , are independent random variables uniformly distributed on [0,1]. By symmetry, E(Y (k)) = kn+1 .
24
Fixing i and summing up the n inequalities given above when j covers N (including j = i), we see
that Envy-Freeness implies Fair Share.
The critical Proposition 2 can be adapted as follows. Set g(x) = ('1(x) '2(x)) ·x1 so that Envy-
Freeness for a symmetric API rule is equivalent to Eµ(g(X))  g(eN) = 0 whenever Eµ(X) = eN ,
and deduce in the same way that there is a vector   2Rn such that ('1(x) '2(x)) ·x1     ·(x eN)
for all x. By the symmetry of ' and '(x)2 (N), it is immediate that there exists ✓  0 such that,
for any x with weakly increasing coordinates,
✓
✓
1  xi 1
xi
◆
'i(x) 'i 1(x) ✓
✓
xi
xi 1
  1
◆
for all i= 1, . . . , n.
Applying this when xi is a geometric sequence with a large exponent gives ✓ 2n(n 1) , and by choos-
ing ✓⇤ = 2
n(n 1) and defining ' appropriately, we guarantee the PoF of the order of n, comparable
to the minimal Price of Envy-Freeness for prior-dependent rules; see Caragiannis et al. (2009).
For a bad, Envy-Freeness is defined with the opposite sign in the inequality. Similarly, we have
that if the coordinates of x are weakly increasing, an Envy-Free rule ' is such that
✓
✓
1  xi 1
xi
◆
'i 1(x) 'i(x) ✓
✓
xi
xi 1
  1
◆
for all i= 1, . . . , n,
where again the parameter ✓ is at most 2
n(n 1) . However, this time the performance of such a rule
is fairly poor, as one can see with ✓⇤ = 2
n(n 1) and the disutility profile xi = 2
i 1 for all i. The most
e cient profile of shares is then 'i(x) = (n  i)✓⇤ and the ratio 1x1 (
Pn
1 'i(x)xi) is then in the order
of 2
n
n2
.
Asymmetric ownership rights
If the agents are endowed with unequal ownership rights on the object, captured by the shares  2
 (N), it is natural to adapt Fair Share as follows (for goods): Eµ('i(X⇤) ·X⇤i )   i for all i. We can
again adapt the argument in Proposition 2 to characterize this constraint by the existence, for each
i, of a linear form lower-bounding the function x!'i(x) ·xi. But we cannot use arguments based
on symmetry to reduce the number of free parameters and the characterization of the undominated
fair rules is much more di cult.
Mixture of goods and bads
The case of objects with utility of a random sign is interesting but di cult: we cannot apply our
technique when expected utilities can be zero; even if this case is ruled out, when realized utilities
are both positive and negative, the rule must for e ciency divide the object between positive utility
agents only and this random change in the size of the recipients throws o↵ our computations,
starting with the Proportional rule (Proposition 1) and the key Propositions 2 and 3.
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8. Conclusion
We initiate the discussion of fair division problems, where the manager has limited access to
statistical information about the realized utilities (or disutilities). Such limitations are the major
concerns in literatures on robust mechanism design and online algorithms, but as far as we know,
they have never been discussed in the field of fair division.
We discuss a prototypical fair division problem with just one random object to divide. The
setting proved to be quite rich and at the same time tractable enough for the explicit description of
the best rules: the entirely new families of the Top-Heavy and Bottom-Heavy rules. By contrast, the
literatures on robust mechanism design and online algorithms typically find a certain approximation
to the best rules, and, in the rare cases where the best rules are described, the best rules turn out
to be previously known ones.
Having the best rules in hand allowed us to push the analysis further and compute the exact
values of the Competitive Ratio and the Price of Fairness. Then we found that, surprisingly, the
risk-averse manager knowing the first moments of the underlying distribution can do almost as well
as the manager having detailed statistical information. We do not have an intuitive explanation
of this e↵ect. Understanding it in greater depth and describing environments that exhibit similar
phenomena would be a challenging avenue for future research.
The paper suggests many concrete theoretical open questions, e.g., the extension of the results
to the setting with many random objects delivered at once, and the other questions touched on in
Section 7.
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Appendix A: Proofs for Section 4
A.1. Proof of Proposition 3
The “if” statement. The proof is the same as the “if” statement in Proposition 2 for goods, after
reversing the inequalities.
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The “only if” statement. The proof is similar to the “only if” statement in Proposition 2. Fix an API
rule ' satisfying FS and define f(x) = '1(x) · x1; by symmetry, f(eN) = 1n . For any coe cients µ 2 (K)
and convex combination
PK
k=1 µky
k = eN in RN+ , we apply FS to the normalized problem in which X = yk
with probability µk and obtain
PK
k=1 µkf(y
k) f(eN). Therefore the concavification g of f coincides with f
at eN , and there is some ↵2RN supporting its graph at (eN , g(eN)), i.e.,
'1(x) ·x1  ↵ · (x  eN)+
1
n
for all x2RN+ .
The same symmetry arguments show that ↵ takes the form ↵= (↵1, , , . . . , ) and ↵ · eN = 1n . This time
the inequality 0'1(x) ·x1  ↵1x1 + xN {1} implies ↵  0. Setting  = n  and rearranging we get:
'i(x)
1
n
+  
✓
x
xi
  1
◆
for all i2N and x2RN+ .
It remains to find the bound on  . Because x
xi
  1
n
, the inequality 'i(x)  0 holds everywhere if it holds at
x= e{i}, where it implies the bound   1
n 1 . Then the change of parameters ✓= (n 1)  implies the desired
inequality (9). ⇤
A.2. Proof of Theorem 2
Step 1. First we define the whole family of Bottom-Heavy rules for ✓ 2 [0,1] by
'
✓
i (x) =
8
>>>>>><
>>>>>>:
1
n
+
✓
n  1
✓
x
xi
  1
◆
, i : xi  x(et)
1
| (x;et+1)|
0
@1 
X
i:xix(et)
'
✓
i (x)
1
A , i2  (x;et+1)
0, otherwise
, (13)
where et is the maximal t= 0,1,2, . . . , n such that
P
i:xix(t)
⇣
1
n
+ ✓
n 1
⇣
x
xi
  1
⌘⌘
 1. The definition is correct
since 1
n
+ ✓
n 1
⇣
x
xi
  1
⌘
is always non-negative and
P
i2N
1
n
+ ✓
n 1
⇣
x
xi
  1
⌘
  1 with strict inequality for x
not parallel to eN and ✓ 6= 0.
Step 2. Next we prove that if the API rule ' satisfies inequalities (9) for some ✓, 0  ✓  1, then '✓
dominates ' or equals '. In Step 3 we show that '1 dominates '✓ if ✓< 1.
First, for ✓ = 0, inequalities (9) imply that ' itself is Equal Split, i.e., '0. From now on, we assume that
✓> 0.
Along the ray through eN the rules ' and '✓ coincide by symmetry. Now we fix x2RN+ not parallel to eN
and let et be defined as above. From (9) we get 'i(x)'✓i (x) for all i such that xi  x(
et). Thus
X
i:xix(et)
('i(x) '✓i (x))xi  
X
i:xix(et)
('i(x) '✓i (x))x(
et+1)
. (14)
Next we have
P
i:xi x(et+1)
'
✓
i (x)xi =
P
i:xi x(et+1)
'
✓
i (x)x
(et+1) because '✓i (x) = 0 if xi >x
(et+1). Thus
X
i:xi x(et+1)
('i(x) '✓i (x))xi  
X
i:xi x(et+1)
('i(x) '✓i (x))x(
et+1)
. (15)
Summing up these two inequalities gives the corresponding weak inequality (3).
Assume finally that all inequalities (3) are equalities. If at least one xi is zero, (9) implies that '(x) does
not put any weight outside  (x,1), and so '(x) ='✓(x). If each xi is strictly positive, our assumption implies
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that (14) is an equality; but the definition of et implies x(et) < x(et+1). Therefore 'i(x) = '✓i (x) as long as
xi  x(et). Now (15) cannot be an equality if '(x) puts any weight on agents with disutilities greater than
x
(et+1), and we conclude that '(x) ='✓(x) by the symmetry of '.
Step 3. We show that '✓
+
dominates '✓
 
if ✓+ > ✓  > 0. We write these rules as '+ and '  for simplicity,
and fix x2RN+ . For "=+, , denote et for '"(x) by t".
We use the notation
 i =
1
n  1
✓
x
xi
  1
◆
and  "i =
1
n
+ ✓" i.
We prove inequality (3) between '+ and '  for a vector x with no two equal coordinates. This will
be enough because each mapping '✓ is only discontinuous at x if | (x,et+ 1)| > 1, and the total disutility
P
i2N '
✓
i (x)xi is continuous at such points.
Finally we label the coordinates of x increasingly, so that xi = x(i) for all i, and the definition of '"(x) is
notationally simpler: '"i (x) =  
"
i > 0 for 1 i t"; 0'"t"+1(x)< "t"+1 ; '"j(x) = 0 for j > t"+1.
We claim first that t+  t , and if t+ = t  = t then   =
'+
t++1
(x)
 +
t++1
< µ =
' 
t +1
(x)
 
t +1
, where 0   , µ < 1. To
prove this we compute
1 =
t+X
1
 
+
i +  
+
t++1 =
t
+ + 
n
+ ✓+( {1,...,t+} +  t++1).
As t
++ 
n
< 1, this implies  {1,...,t+} +  t++1 > 0; therefore,
1>
t
+ + 
n
+ ✓ ( {1,...,t+} +  t++1).
However, by repeating the computation above for ' (x) we get
1 =
t
  +µ
n
+ ✓ ( {1,...,t } +µ t +1).
We see that t  < t+ leads to a contradiction between the last two statements. Also, if t  = t+ = t they imply
  
 
t+1 <µ 
 
t+1, and so  <µ because  
 
i > 0 for all i. The claim is proved.
Next we evaluate the di↵erence   in total disutility generated by our two rules:
 =
X
N
('+i (x) ' i (x))xi =
=
t+X
1
( +i    i )xi +(  +t++1   
 
t++1)xt++1  
t X
t++2
 
 
i xi  µ  t +1xt +1,
where we have assumed that t+ < t ; if instead t+ = t  = t the last three terms of the sum reduce to
(  +t+1  µ  t+1)xt++1. As xi is increasing in i we have
 
t+X
1
( +i    i )xi +  +t++1xt++1   ( 
 
{t++1,...,t } +µ 
 
t +1)xt++1
and from '+N(x) = '
 
N(x) we get  
 
{t++1,...,t } + µ 
 
t +1 =
Pt+
1 ( 
+
i     i ) +   +t++1. Rearranging the right-
hand term in the above inequality, and recalling the definition of  "i gives
 
t+X
1
( +i    i )(xi  xt++1) = (✓+   ✓ )
t+X
1
 i(xi  xt++1).
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We show finally that the right-hand term above is strictly negative, as desired.
The sequence  i is (strictly) decreasing and initially positive. As  {1,...,t+}+  t++1 > 0, we have  {1,...,t+} >
0. The sequence  i = xt++1   xi is positive and (strictly) decreasing. These facts imply that
Pt+
1  i i is
strictly positive. Let  i⇤ be the first strictly negative term in the sequence  i: we have
Pi⇤ 1
1  i i  
Pi⇤ 1
1  i i⇤
as all terms are non-negative and  i is decreasing; also
Pt+
i⇤  i i >
Pt+
i⇤  i i⇤ as  i < 0 and  i <  i⇤ . Thus
  =
Pt+
1  i i >  {1,...,t+} i⇤ . ⇤
Appendix B: Proofs for Section 5
B.1. Proof of Lemma 1
For goods. The inequality CRn(') PoFn(') is clear. Next, for any P 2 ⇧n there exists some x 2 RN+
such that
Eµ(maxiXi)
S(',P) 
maxi xiP
i2N 'i(x) ·xi
.
This proves PoFn(') supx2RN+
maxi xiP
i2N 'i(x)·xi
.
Next we pick an arbitrary x 2 RN+ and check the inequality maxi xiP
i2N 'i(x)·xi
 CRn('), thus completing the
proof. Consider a problem P 2 ⇧n that selects each of the n! permutations of 1xx with equal probability
1
n! . We call a problem symmetric if the distribution µ is symmetric in all variables xi. By the symmetry of
the rule ' we have S(',P) =
P
i2N 'i(x) · xi. It will be enough to construct a rule  2  (FS) such that
S( ,P) =maxi xi, because S( ,P)S(',P) CRn('). To this end, we note that the Utilitarian rule '
ut violates FS
in general (see the example in Section 2.1) but not if the problem P is symmetric.14 Thus, we can pick a  
that is equal to 'ut for symmetric problems, and satisfies FS elsewhere.
For bads. The argument is similar and therefore omitted. ⇤
B.2. Proof of Proposition 4
Statement i). Pick '2 ind(FS) and P 2⇧n. The FS property implies
S(',P) =
X
i2N
Eµ('i(X) ·Xi) 
1
n
X
i2N
Eµ(Xi) 
1
n
Eµ(max
i
Xi)
and the first claim follows. If ' is the Equal Split rule, the first inequality shown above is an equality, and
the second one is an equality if the random variable X is uniform over the coordinate profiles e{i}.
Statement ii). By Lemma 1 we must evaluate supx2RN+ {0}
P
i2N xiP
i2N x
2
i
maxi xi. By rescaling x we can assume
that x1 = 1=maxi 2 xi; then we must show that
sup
1+
Pn
2 xi
1+
Pn
2 x
2
i
=
p
n+1
2
,
where the supremum is on all x2, . . . , xn 2 [0,1]. The argument is straightforward and therefore omitted.
Statement iii). We fix ✓, 0< ✓ 1, set N = {1, . . . , n}, and rewrite inequalities (4) as
'
✓
i (x) max
⇢✓
1
n
+
✓
n  1
◆
  ✓
n(n  1)
xN
xi
, 0
 
for all i and x2RN+ .
14 Indeed, Eµ(X1) Eµ(maxiXi) = S('ut,P) =
P
iEµ('
ut
i (X) ·Xi) = nEµ('ut1 (X) ·X1).
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By Lemma 1 we must evaluate the smallest feasible value of 1
x(n)
{
Pn
i=1'
✓
i (x) · xi} in RN+ . This function is
continuous in x (even though '✓ itself is not in those profiles where several agents have the highest utility),
and so it will be enough to compute the infimum of this ratio for profiles x such that xi <xn for all i n 1.
We first compute the desired lower bound when ( 1
n
+ ✓
n 1 ) 
✓
n(n 1)
xN
xi
  0 for all i, so that all agents
i n  1 get exactly this share and agent n gets
'
✓
n(x) = 1 
n 1X
i=1
'
✓
i (x) =
1
n
  ✓+ ✓
n(n  1)
0
@
 
n 1X
i=1
1
xi
!
xn +n  1+
X
{i,j}⇢{1,...,n 1}
✓
xi
xj
+
xj
xi
◆1
A .
On the right-hand side, if we fix the sum
Pn 1
i=1 xi, the first sum is minimal when all utilities are equal;
the second sum is also minimal and equal to (n  1)(n  2) when utilities are equal. It is also clear that for
i, j  n  1 the sum '✓i (x) · xi + '✓j (x) · xj is constant when we equalize xi and xj while keeping their sum
constant. Thus, we can assume that xi = y for 1 i n  1, so that the share of agent n is
'
✓
n(x) =
1
n
  ✓+ ✓
n
✓
xn
y
+n  1
◆
=
1
n
(1  ✓)+ ✓
n
xn
y
.
Then we compute
1
xn
nX
i=1
'
✓
i (x) ·xi
!
='✓n(x)+ (n  1)
y ·'✓1(x)
xn
=
1
n
✓
(1  2✓)+ ✓xn
y
+(n  1+ ✓) y
xn
◆
and the minimum in xn, y of this expression is achieved for
xn
y
=
  (n 1+✓)
✓
  1
2 (which is greater than 1, as
needed) and its value is
1
n
⇣
(1  2✓)+ 2
p
(n  1+ ✓)✓
⌘
,
as stated. Clearly it is decreasing in ✓.
It remains to consider the case where for some i⇤  n  1 we have, for all i i⇤   1 and all j   i⇤,
✓
1
n
+
✓
n  1
◆
  ✓
n(n  1)
xN
xi
< 0
✓
1
n
+
✓
n  1
◆
  ✓
n(n  1)
xN
xj
.
Observe that if we decrease xi to zero for all i i⇤ 1 without changing other coordinates, the share of each
agent j, i⇤  j  n  1, increases (strictly if some xi is positive), while that of agent n decreases; therefore
the ratio 1
x(n)
{
Pn
i=1'
✓
i (x) · xi} decreases. Thus, it is enough to assume xi = 0 for all i i⇤   1. Computing
the share of agent n and the total utility
Pn
i=1'
✓
i (x) · xi is then more involved but very similar, and the
argument that we can assume xi = y for i⇤  i n  1 is unchanged. Therefore,
'
✓
n(x) =
i
⇤
n
✓
1  n  i
⇤
n  1 ✓
◆
+
n  i⇤
n(n  1)✓
xn
y
,
1
xn
nX
i=1
'
✓
i (x) ·xi
!
=
i
⇤
n
  (n  i
⇤)(i⇤ +1)
n(n  1) ✓+
n  i⇤
n(n  1)
✓
✓
xn
y
+(n  1+ i⇤✓) y
xn
◆
of which the minimum in xn, y is
i
⇤
n
  (n  i
⇤)
n(n  1)
⇣
(i⇤ +1)✓  2
p
(n  1+ i⇤✓)✓
⌘
and this quantity is increasing in i⇤ because (i⇤ +1)✓  2
p
(n  1+ i⇤✓)✓ does. Therefore, the worst case is
i
⇤ = 1, and we are done.
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Table 6 Sates and utilities
state !1 !2 . . . !m
probability 1/m 1/m . . . 1/m
X1 m 0 . . . 0
X2 0 m . . . 0
... 0 0
. . . 0
Xm 0 0 . . . m
Xm+1 1 1 . . . 1
... 1 1 . . . 1
Xn 1 1 . . . 1
Statement iv). Clearly inf'2 (FS)PoFn(')  inf'2 ind(FS)PoFn(')  PoFn('1), and so the inequality
inf'2 (FS)PoFn(') n2pn 1 follows from Lemma 1 and statement iii).
Next we fix n,m, such that 1  m  n   1 and consider the problem P(n,m) 2 ⇧n with n agents, m
equiprobable states, and the utilities defined in Table 6.
Let N1 be the set of the m “single-minded” agents and N2 be the set of the other n m “indi↵erent”
agents. Fix an arbitrary prior-dependent rule ' 2 (FS) and let Eµ(Yi) = Eµ('µi (X) ·Xi) be the expected
utility of agent i.
We denote by  k the total share ' gives to N2 at state !k. Then the identity Eµ(YN2) = 1m
Pm
k=1  k and
Fair Share imply
Pm
k=1  k  
m(n m)
n
. If ' gives the remaining shares to single-minded agent k in state !k,
then Eµ(YN1) = 1m
Pm
k=1(1   k)m =m 
Pm
k=1  k. This is the best ' can do for the utilitarian objective.
Compute
Eµ(YN) = m 
mX
k=1
 k
!
+
1
m
mX
k=1
 k
!
=m  m  1
m
mX
k=1
 k 
m  (m  1)(n m)
n
=
m
2
n
  m
n
+1
=)
✓
Eµ(maxiXi)
Eµ(YN)
◆ 1
=
Eµ(YN)
m
 m
n
+
1
m
  1
n
.
The minimum of m
n
+ 1
m
  1
n
over real numbers is achieved for m=
p
n, and is worth 2p
n
  1
n
= (CRn('1)) 1.
As m is an integer and m! f(m) = m
n
+ 1
m
is convex, the minimum over integers is at most ↵=max{f(
p
n+
1
2 ), f(
p
n  12 )}. Routine computations show that ↵
2p
n
+ 12n ; therefore
⇣
Eµ(maxi Xi)
Eµ(YN )
⌘ 1
 2
p
n  12
n
and the
proof is complete. ⇤
B.3. Proof of Proposition 5
Statement i). If ' is the Equal Split rule, then 1mini xi (
P
i2N 'i(x) · xi) =
xN
n·mini xi
for all x 2 RN+ . This
ratio is clearly unbounded, and the claim follows by Lemma 1.
Recall that, by definition, the Proportional rule 'pro coincides with the Utilitarian rule at any profile
x 2 RN+ with at least one zero coordinate. For x  0 we have 1mini xi (
P
i2N '
pro
i (x) · xi) = 1mini xi
nP
i2N
1
xi
=
ex
mini xi
, where ex is the harmonic mean of xi. The inequality ex nmini xi is always true, and asymptotically
becomes an equality when x1 =mini xi, and all other coordinates are equal and go to infinity. Therefore, the
CRn('pro) is indeed n.
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Statement ii). The lower bound follows from the lower bound on inf'2 (FS)PoFn(') (statement iii
proven below) and from CRn('1) = PoFn('1)  inf'2 (FS)PoFn(').
To prove the upper bound PoFn('1) n4 +
5
4 , we fix an arbitrary profile x and majorize
1
mini xi
(
P
i2N '
1
i (x) ·
xi). Because '1 is homogeneous of degree zero and symmetric, and '1 coincides with the Utilitarian rule if
x1 = 0, we can without loss of generality assume that x1 = 1 and xi is weakly increasing in i. We must bound
UN(x) =
P
i2N '
1
i (x) · xi. By the continuity of UN(x), we can assume that none of the coordinates of x are
equal, i.e., that xi is strictly increasing.
By the definition of '1 there exists an index et such that
1
n(n  1)
etX
i=1
xN {i}
xi
 1< 1
n(n  1)
et+1X
i=1
xN {i}
xi
and '1i (x) =
1
n(n 1)
xN {i}
xi
for i et.
We set  = n(n  1) 
Pet
i=1
xN {i}
xi
,    0, and develop UN(x) as follows:
n(n  1)UN(x) =
etX
i=1
xN {i} + xet+1 = (et  1)
etX
i=1
xi +et
nX
j=et+1
xj + xet+1.
Suppose that we replace each xi, 2 i et, by their average y= 1et 1
Pet
i=2, ceteris paribus: this will decrease
the total weight given by '1 to these coordinates, which is xN
n(n 1) (
Pet
2
1
xi
), and it will increase the weight to
coordinates xet+1 and beyond. Therefore, this move increases UN(x), and so we can assume that these et  1
coordinates are all equal to y. We also set
Pn
j=et+1 xj =w. Now we try to bound
n(n  1)UN(x) = (et  1)(1+ (et  1)y)+etw+ xet+1
under the constraints
 = n(n  1)+et  (1+ (et  1)y+w) 1+
et  1
y
!
  0 ; 0 xet+1  1+ (1 et)y+w ; w  (n et)y,
where we infer the second inequality from the fact that   xN {(et+1)}
xet+1
and the third one from the fact that
the coordinates of x are weakly increasing. These inequalities imply
n(n  1)UN(x) et(1+ (et  1)y)+ (et+1)w,
(1+(et 1)y+w) 1+
et  1
y
!
 n(n 1)+et=)
 
1+
et  1
y
!
w n(n 1) (et 1)
✓
y+
1
y
◆
+(et 1) (et 1)2
=)w (n(n  1)+et  1) y
y+et  1
  (et  1)y.
Combining w  (n et)y and the upper bound above gives
(n et)y (n(n  1)+et  1) y
y+et  1
  (et  1)y=) y+et  1 n+
et  1
n  1  n+1.
Next we combine the upper bound on n(n  1)UN(x) with that on w:
n(n  1)UN(x) et(1+ (et  1)y)+ (et+1)(n(n  1)+et  1)
y
y+et  1
  (et+1)(et  1)y=
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= et  (et  1)y+(et+1)(n(n  1)+et  1) y
y+et  1
.
We now majorize the above upper bound in the two real variables et, y such that y + et  n + 2. Observe
first that this bound is increasing in y because its derivative has the sign of (
et+1)(n(n 1)+et 1)
(y+et 1)2   1 and
(et+1)(n(n 1)+et 1)
(y+et 1)2  
3(n2 n+1)
(n+1)2 . Thus, we can take y + et = n and use the inequality
et+1
n+1  1 to deduce the
bound
n(n  1)UN(x) et+
n(n  1)(et+1)y
n+1
+ (et  1)y
et+1
n+1
  1
!
 n+ n(n  1)
n+1
(et+1)(n+2 et).
The maximum in et of (et+1)(n+2 et) is (n+3)
2
4 for et=
n+1
2 ; therefore
=)UN(x)
1
n  1 +
(n+3)2
4(n+1)
=
n
4
+
5
4
  2
n2   1 ,
completing the proof of statement ii).
Statement iii).
Step 1. Lower bound on inf'2 (FS)PoFn('). Consider the normalized problem P with two equally
probable states !,!0, and the corresponding profiles of disutilities
x1 =
4
n+1
, xi = 2 for 2 i n ; x01 = 2 ·
n  1
n+1
, x
0
i = 0 for 2 i n.
Without the FS constraint the total disutility is minimized by giving to agent 1 the whole bad in state !,
and no share at all in state !0, so that Eµ(miniXi) = 2n+1 . The FS constraint caps the share of agent 1
at n+12n in state ! and so at least
n 1
2n goes to the other agents and the expected total disutility is at least
1
n
+ 12
n 1
2n 2 =
n+1
2n . Therefore, for any '2 (FS) we have
S(',P)
Eµ(miniXi)
  (n+1)
2
4n
=
n
4
+
1
2
+
1
4n
.
Step 2. Upper bound on inf'2 (FS)PoFn('). Fix a problem P 2⇧n and let C denote the compact convex
set of the disutility profiles feasible by some prior-dependent rule. Then C contains the simplex  (N) because
the rule giving the object always to agent i achieves the unit vector ei. Let x 2 C achieve the smallest total
disutility in C: xN =Eµ(miniXi). We must construct a profile y in C satisfying FS and such that
yN 
✓
n
4
+
1
2
+
1
4n
◆
xN .
If x satisfies FS we can take y= x and if xN = 1 we take y=
1
n
e
N , the center of the simplex. Otherwise some
coordinates of x are above 1
n
; upon relabeling coordinates we have
x1   . . .  xt >
1
n
  xt+1   . . .  xn
and we keep in mind xN < 1. We use below the notation K = {1, . . . , t} and L= {t+1, . . . , n}.
We wish to choose y=  x+ 0⌧ , a convex combination of x and some ⌧ 2 (N), such that
 xk + 
0
⌧k =
1
n
for 1 k t ;  x`+ 0⌧` 
1
n
for t+1 ` n.
For any   2 [0,1] such that  x1  1n , each one of the t equalities shown above defines ⌧k in [0,1] (because
 xk + 0    n + 
0   1
n
) and their sum ⌧K . We can then find non-negative numbers ⌧` satisfying the last n  t
inequalities as well as ⌧L = 1  ⌧K i↵ ⌧K  1 and  xL + 0⌧L  n tn .
33
By construction,  0⌧K =
t
n
  xK and so the last two inequalities are
⌧K  1()
t
n
  xK   0 ()  (1 xK)
n  t
n
,
 xL + 
0(1  ⌧K)
n  t
n
()  xL + xK + 0  1() xN  1.
The latter inequality is true. The former is a consequence of  x1  1n because by the definition of K we
have (n  t)x1 + xK > 1, implying 1nx1 <
n t
n(1 xK)
. Therefore  x1  1n is the only constraint on the choice of
 .
We choose   to minimize
yN
xN
=
 xN + 0
xN
=  +
1  
xN
=
1
xN
  ( 1
xN
  1),
which is decreasing in  . Therefore we pick  = 1
nx1
to get
yN
xN
=
nx1   1
nx1xN
+
1
nx1
 nx1   1
nx21
+
1
nx1
=
n+1
n
1
x1
  1
nx21
.
We leave it to the reader to check that the maximum of the right-hand term for x1 2 [ 1n ,1] is reached at
x1 =
2
n+1 and is precisely
n
4 +
1
2 +
1
4n . ⇤
Interestingly, the PoF we just computed is the inverse of the “price of maximin fairness” for classic
bargaining problems (corresponding in our model to the division of a good); see Bertsimas et al. (2011,
Theorem 1).
Appendix C: Asymptotic results and missing proofs for Section 6
C.1. A good
Proposition 6. Fix a distribution ⌫ of Xi with E⌫X1 = 1 and E⌫(X1)  <1 for some   > 2. Consider a
problem Pn(⌫) with n agents and µ=⌦ni=1⌫. Then the ratio for the TH rule '✓, ✓ 2 (0,1], satisfies
⇡('✓,Pn(⌫)) =
1
1 E⌫
⇣
1+ ✓  ✓
X1
⌘
+
+
E⌫(X1(1+✓) ✓)+
Eµ(X(n))
✓
1+O
✓
1
n
1
2 
1
 
◆◆
, (16)
for a large number of agents15 n. Here (y)+ denotes max{y,0}.
Note that the only dependence on n in formula (16) is through the expected value of X(n) =maxi=1,..,nXi
and the error term.
Proof of Proposition 6. For simplicity, we assume that ✓= 1 (proofs for other values of ✓ follow the same
logic).
By the definition of the TH rule '1 we can represent the social welfare as
X
i
Xi'
1
i (X) =
nX
i=1
Xi
✓
2
n
  XN  Xi
n(n  1)Xi
◆
+
+X(n) 1 
nX
i=1
✓
2
n
  XN  Xi
n(n  1)Xi
◆
+
!
=
=A+X(n)  B.
15
an =O(bn) if there exist n0 and C > 0 such that |an|C|bn| for all n  n0.
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Consider the contribution of A first. Since all Xi have the same distribution, it follows that EµA =
Eµ
⇣
2X1  
P
j 6=1 Xj
n 1
⌘
+
. Let us show that  0 =Eµ(A) E⌫ (2X1   1)+ is small. The function ( · )+ is Lipschitz
with constant one; thus by the Cauchy inequality and the independence of Xj , we have
| 0|Eµ
✓    1 
P
j 6=1Xj
n  1
    
◆
=
1
n  1Eµ
      
X
j 6=1
(Xj   1)
     
!

 1
n  1
vuutEµ
X
j 6=1
(Xj   1)
!2
=
p
V⌫(X1)p
n  1
=O
✓
1p
n
◆
if the variance V⌫ of X1 is finite.
Now we will check that Eµ(B) is close to Eµ(X(n)) ·E⌫ ((2  1/X1)+) (as if X(n) is independent of Xi and
P
Xj approximately equals its expectation). This is done in two steps:
• Step 1: Prove that Eµ(B) does not change much if we substitute (2  1/X1)+ for (2 
P
j 6=1Xj/(n 
1)X1)+.
• Step 2: Prove that the random variables X(n) and (2  1/X1)+ can be decoupled; the expected value of
the product is close to the product of expectations.
Step 1:
P
j 6=1Xj/(n  1) can be replaced by its expectation. Since Xj are independent and identically
distributed we have
Eµ(B) =Eµ X(n)
✓
2 
P
j 6=1Xj
(n  1)X1
◆
+
!
=E X(n)
✓
2  1
X1
◆
+
!
+ 1,
where
 1 =Eµ X(n)
 ✓
2 
P
j 6=1Xj
(n  1)X1
◆
+
 
✓
2  1
X1
◆
+
!!
=Eµ
 
X
(n)
h(X)
 
.
Consider two cases depending on how far the sum
P
j 6=1Xj is from its expected value. Let Q be the event that   
P
j Xj
n 1   1
   > 12 , Q its complement, and 1Q, 1Q their indicator functions. Then the probability Pµ(Q) =E(1Q)
is at most 8V⌫(X1)
n 1 by the Markov inequality. Let us represent  1 as Eµ
 
X
(n)
h(X)1Q
 
+Eµ
 
X
(n)
h(X)1Q
 
.
For the first term, we use the estimate h 2 and then apply the Cauchy inequality:
Eµ
 
X
(n)|h(X)|1Q
 
 2Eµ
 
X
(n)1Q
 

q
Eµ (|X(n)|2)
q
Pµ(Q).
To bound the second term, consider the following inequality for y, z  2:
  |y|+  |z|+
   (1y 0+1z 0) ·
  y z
  .
Applying it to h we get
|h(x)| 1⇢
1
x1
 2(n 1)P
j 6=1 xj
  +1n 1
x1
2
o
!    
P
j 6=1 xj
(n  1)x1
  1
x1
     .
For x 2 Q, the function h is non-zero only if 1
x1
 43 . Thus, for such x, we have |h(x)| 
8
3
   
P
j 6=1(xj 1)
n 1
    .
Finally, we get
Eµ
 
X
(n)|h(X)|1Q
 
 8
3(n  1)Eµ X
(n)
     
X
j 6=1
(Xj   1)
     
!
 8
3(n  1)
q
Eµ (|X(n)|2)
vuuutE
0
@
 
X
j 6=1
(Xj   1)
!21
A .
Combining all the estimates together, we see that | 1|= O
✓q
Eµ(|X(n)|2)
p
n
◆
. We will estimate Eµ
 
|X(n)|2
 
at the end of the proof.
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Step 2: Decouple X(n) and (2  1/X1)+. We proved that B is close to Eµ
 
X
(n)(2  1/X1)+
 
. Now we
want to decouple the two factors and show that B is close to Eµ
 
X
(n)
 
· E⌫ ((2  1/X1)+). Define  2 =
Eµ(X(n)) ·E⌫
✓⇣
2  1
X1
⌘
+
◆
 Eµ
✓
X
(n)
⇣
2  1
X1
⌘
+
◆
. The random variable ⇠ =maxi=2...nXi is independent
of
⇣
2  1
X1
⌘
+
. Therefore,
 2 =Eµ(X(n)   ⇠) ·E⌫
✓
2  1
X1
◆
+
 Eµ (X(n)   ⇠)
✓
2  1
X1
◆
+
!
.
By definition, X(n) is greater than ⇠. Hence | 2| 2Eµ(X(n)  ⇠). To estimate the di↵erence of expectations
define X(n) j as maxk=1,..n, j 6=iXk. Then E(X
(n)
 j ) = E(⇠) for all j. If Xi =X(n), then all X
(n)
 j except the one
with j = i coincide and are equal to X(n). Thus, nE(⇠) =E
⇣P
j=1..nX
(n)
 j
⌘
  (n  1)E(X(n)) and E(X(n)) 
E(⇠) E(X
(n))
n
. Finally, | 2|=O
⇣
Eµ(X(n))
n
⌘
.
Let us estimate Eµ
  
X
(n)
 ↵ 
. For ↵> 0, we have Eµ
  
X
(n)
 ↵ 
= 
R1
0
t
↵
dPµ({X(n)   t}) and integration
by part gives
↵
Z 1
0
t
↵ 1Pµ({X(n)   t})dt=
Z T
0
+
Z 1
T
.
The first integral does not exceed T↵. To estimate the second one we combine the union bound with the
Markov inequality: Pµ({X(n)   t}) nP⌫({X1   t}) nE⌫((X1)
 )
t 
. Therefore,
↵
Z 1
T
t
↵ 1Pµ({X(n)   t})dt ↵nE⌫
 
(X1)
 
 Z 1
T
t
↵   1
dt=
↵
  ↵nE⌫
 
(X1)
 
  1
T   ↵
for   > ↵. Optimizing over T , we get Eµ
  
X
(n)
 ↵ 
⇣
 
  ↵
⌘
(nE⌫ ((X1) ))
↵
  =O
 
n
↵
 
 
.
It remains to put all the pieces together:
 0 + 1 + 2 =O
✓
1p
n
◆
+O
 p
Eµ (|X(n)|2)p
n
!
+O
✓
Eµ(X(n))
n
◆
=O
✓
1
n
1
2 
1
 
◆
for any   > 2 such that E⌫(X1)  <1. This implies formula (16) for ✓= 1. ⇤
C.1.1. Proof of Lemma 2
For unbounded distributions, E
 
X
(n)
 
tends to +1 and thus by Proposition 6 the ratio for '1 converges
to
✓
1 E⌫
⇣
2  1
X1
⌘
+
◆ 1
. Thus, the lower bound immediately follows from the inequality |x1   1|   x1  
⇣
2  1
x1
⌘
+
.
For the upper bound, we have
 
⇡('1,P1(⌫))
  1  E⌫ X1  
✓
2  1
X1
◆
+
!
 E⌫ X1  
✓
2  1
X1
◆
+
!
1{X1 1}
!
=
=E⌫
✓✓
X1 +
1
X1
  2
◆
1{X1 1}
◆
=E⌫
✓✓
(X1   1)2
X1
◆
1{X1 1}
◆
=E⌫ (g(X1)1{X1 1}) ,
where 1A stands for the indicator of the event A. In order to relate the expected value of g(X1) to D, we
apply the Cauchy inequality
D
2
=E⌫ (|X1   1|1{X1 1}) =E⌫
p
g(X1)1{X1 1} ·
|X1   1|1{X1 1}p
g(X1)
!

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
q
E⌫ (g(X1)1{X1 1})
s
E⌫
✓
(X1   1)2
g(X1)
1{X1 1}
◆
.
The second factor on the right-hand side can be estimated as follows:
E⌫
✓
(X1   1)2
g(X1)
1{X1 1}
◆
=E⌫ (X11{X1 1}) =E⌫ (|X1   1|1{X1 1})+E⌫ (1{X1 1})
D
2
+1,
which completes the proof. ⇤
C.2. Bads
C.2.1. Not much weight around zero
Proposition 7. Consider a distribution ⌫ such that E⌫(X1) = 1 and E⌫
⇣
1
X1
⌘
<1. Then the ratio for
the BH rule can be represented as
⇡('1,Pn(⌫)) =
P⌫({X1 <T})+  P⌫({X1 = T})
Eµ (mini2N Xi)
(1+ o(1)), n!1, (17)
where T > 0 and  , 0   < 1, are defined by the following condition:16
E⌫
✓
1{X1<T}
X1
◆
+  P({X1 = T})
1
T
= 1.
For the Proportional rule,
⇡('pro,Pn(⌫)) =
1
Eµ(mini2N Xi) ·E⌫
⇣
1
X1
⌘ (1+ o(1)). (18)
Proof. As in the proof of Proposition 6, the symmetry of the problem implies S('1,Pn(⌫)) =
nEµ (X1'11(X)) and hence it is enough to estimate the contribution of one agent. We will calculate this
expectation in two steps: assuming first that X1 = z is fixed and averaging over Xj , j   2, and then averaging
over z.
Consider Eµ (nX1'11(X) |X1 = z). By the definition of the BH rule we get
n ·X1'1(X)
  
X1=z
=
XN\1
(n  1) · 1Q + z ·
1 
P
j:Xj<z
1
n
XN\j
(n 1)Xj
|{j 2N : Xj = z}|/n
· 1Q0 , (19)
where Q is the event that
P
j:Xjz
XN\j
n(n 1)Xj
 1 (in other words, i belongs to the group of agents whose share
is given by the first line of equation (10)) and the event Q0 tells us that the share of agent 1 comes from the
second line of (10), i.e.,
P
j:Xj<z
XN\j
n(n 1)Xj
< 1<
P
j:Xjz
XN\j
n(n 1)Xj
.
Let us apply the strong law of large numbers to (19). Then,
XN\1
n 1 converges to 1 almost surely, and the
sum
P
j:Xjz
XN\j
n(n 1)Xj
from the definition of Q converges to E⌫
⇣
1
Xj
· 1{Xjz}
⌘
. Therefore, the first summand
of (19) tends to 1{z<T}, where T is defined as inf
n
T
0
  E⌫
⇣ 1{XjT 0}
Xj
⌘
  1
o
. Thus, the asymptotic contribution
of the first term to S('1,P) is P⌫({X1 <T}).
A similar application of the law of large numbers allows us to compute the contribution of the second
summand. We omit these computations. ⇤
16 Formulas simplify for continuous distribution because P(Xi = T ) = 0 for all T and thus we can always pick   = 0.
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C.2.2. Singularity at zero
Lemma 5. If a distribution ⌫ has an atom at zero, then the BH and Proportional rules achieve the optimal
social cost in the limit:
⇡('1,P1(⌫)) = ⇡('pro,P1(⌫)) = 1.
If there is no atom and ⌫ has a continuous density f on (0, a], but this density is unbounded, namely,
f(x) =  
x↵
(1+ o(1)) as x!+0 for some  > 0 and ↵2 (0,1), then
⇡('1,P1(⌫)) = 1; however, ⇡('pro,Pn(⌫)) =⌦ (n) .
Sketch of the proof. In the case of an atom, there is an agent i having Xi = 0 with high probability for
large n. In such a situation, both rules '1 and 'pro coincide with the Utilitarian rule and therefore their
ratios are equal to 1.
The second statement is proved similarly to Lemma 4. For such ⌫, the expected value of the order statistic
X
(k) for small k equals
 
1 ↵
 
k
n
  1
1 ↵ · (1+ o(1)). Therefore, only the agent i with Xi =minj Xj receives a bad
under the BH rule with high probability, which gives ⇡('1,P1(⌫)) = 1. The argument for the Proportional
rule is similar and therefore omitted.
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